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Prospective and retrospective metacognitive judgments have been studied extensively
in the field of memory; however, their accuracy has not been systematically compared.
Such a comparison is important for studying how metacognitive judgments are formed.
Here, we present the results of an experiment aiming to investigate the relation between
performance in an anagram task and the accuracy of prospective and retrospective
confidence judgments. Participants worked on anagrams and were then asked to
respond whether a presented word was the solution. They also rated their confidence,
either before or after the response and either before or after seeing the suggested
solution. The results showed that although response accuracy always correlated with
confidence, this relationship was weaker when metacognitive judgements were given
before the response. We discuss the theoretical and methodological implications of this
finding for studies on metacognition and consciousness.
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INTRODUCTION
When realizing we were wrong we sometimes disappointedly think: “But I was so sure!” We
remember being certain that we would give the right answer or make the correct choice. But
how well does confidence predict future decision accuracy? Is certainty in a forthcoming response
as accurate as certainty in a response that has been already given? In this article we present an
experiment aiming to answer these questions by comparing metacognitive accuracy of prospective
and retrospective confidence judgments.
The term “metacognition” most generally means “cognition about cognition” and refers to
knowledge about ongoing task performance (Fleming and Dolan, 2012), access to one’s knowledge
(Scott and Dienes, 2008), perceptual awareness (Rounis et al., 2010), or even self-awareness
(Metcalfe and Son, 2012). Metacognition has been studied in various research fields such as
metamemory (e.g., Busey et al., 2000), decision-making (e.g., Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010), and
metacognitive awareness (e.g., Sandberg et al., 2010). The common issue in those studies is the
assessment ofmetacognitive accuracy (also referred to asmetacognitive sensitivity or performance),
meaning the extent to which metacognitive judgments predict the accuracy of task performance
(also called type 1 task). Across fields, many measures have been introduced (see e.g., Fleming
and Dolan, 2012) which assess metacognition at different time points in relation to a type 1
response. However, the potential difference in metacognitive accuracy measured retrospectively
and prospectively is often not taken into consideration. For example, metacognitive awareness is
Siedlecka et al. But I Was So Sure!
measured sometimes before (e.g., Del Cul et al., 2009; Wierzchon´
et al., 2012, 2014; Jachs et al., 2015), sometimes after (e.g., Del
Cul et al., 2007; Wierzchon´ et al., 2012, 2014; Zehetleitner and
Rausch, 2013; Jachs et al., 2015) and sometimes simultaneously
with a response to a type 1 task (e.g., Rounis et al., 2010).
Retrospective and prospective judgments have been
differentiated and studied extensively by metamemory
researchers. While prospective judgments are used to predict
future performance, retrospective judgments refer to the
accuracy of past responses. Prospective metacognition is
typically measured either at the stage of acquiring knowledge
or at the time of retrieval. For example, participants might be
asked to predict the probability of future recall of an item they
have just studied, that is, to give judgments about learning (JOL;
Dunlosky et al., 2005). Participants might also be presented first
with test questions and, when not able to retrieve the answer,
asked to judge the probability of recognizing it later, that is,
to rate their feeling of knowing (FOK; Metcalfe et al., 1993).
Retrospective metacognition has been usually measured as
person’s confidence in a given response, for example, recognizing
a stimulus presented earlier (Busey et al., 2000). It is important
to note that when both prospective and retrospective judgments
are given in the same study, participants are usually first asked
to recall or recognize items presented previously and then to
assess confidence in their responses. Then, feeling of knowing
is reported only for items that were not recalled correctly
(Schnyer et al., 2004). Similarly, judgments of learning are
sometimes taken after retrieval attempt and after confidence
ratings (Dougherty et al., 2005). Therefore, although FOKs and
JOLs are prospective in a way they refer to future performance,
they might be, similarly to retrospective judgements, reported
after initial, pre-judgment response.
Although both prospective and retrospective judgments
correlate with actual performance accuracy (e.g., Chua
et al., 2009), to the best of our knowledge, the accuracy of
metacognitive judgments immediately preceding and following
type 1 responses has not been directly compared in the same
study. Such a comparison seems interesting concerning different
neural correlates of prospective and retrospective judgments
(Schnyer et al., 2004; Pannu et al., 2005; Chua et al., 2009),
but also is crucial in the context of the on-going debate about
mechanisms of metacognition. Two main theoretical proposals
have been offered by memory researchers. The first, called
“direct-access” or “trace-strength,” states that metacognitive
judgments are based on direct (but sometimes only partial)
access to memory content that allows people to know that they
know, even though they cannot recall (i.e., articulate) given
information at the moment (Hart, 1965; Metcalfe, 2000). The
alternative, “cue-utilization” view, states that metacognition is
a result of conscious and unconscious inference that might be
based on number of cues derived from knowledge and experience
(e.g., Koriat and Levy-Sadot, 2000; Serra and Metcalfe, 2009).
For example, to judge their future performance in a task, people
use general knowledge about their memory functioning and
their previous experience with a given type of content (Koriat
and Levy-Sadot, 2000). Metacognitive judgments might be
additionally informed by cognitive experiences like retrieval
fluency or item familiarity (Metcalfe et al., 1993; Koriat and
Ma’ayan, 2005).
The quest for a more general explanation of metacognitive
judgements has been undertaken in the area of studying
the decision-making process and judgment confidence. Here,
similarly to the metamemory studies, attempts are made to
explain the basis of metacognitive judgments, but on a much
shorter time scale. Most contemporary confidence theories are
based on the assumption that each decision and judgment is a
result of accumulating evidence over time. However, certainty
theories differ in terms of whether the evidence available at
the time of a type 1 decision (i.e., match between test item
and memory trace) is the only information fed to confidence.
On one hand, the “direct translation hypothesis” (Higham
et al., 2009; Fleming and Dolan, 2012), derived from signal
detection theory, states that both confidence judgment about
a given choice and the choice itself are based on the same
information (i.e., Vickers and Lee, 1998). Therefore, similarly,
with regards to the “trace-strength” view on memory, this should
imply no differences between the accuracy of retrospective
and prospective confidence judgments. The alternative view
states that metacognitive accuracy depends on additional, post-
decision processing (Petrusic and Baranski, 2003; Pleskac and
Busemeyer, 2010). This, similarly to the inference account, allows
the possibility that retrospective confidence judgments are based
on a different amount of information than prospective ones.
It is important to note that confidence is usually defined
as a retrospective judgment. Although many certainty models
have been proposed they do not explain prospective confidence
as they apply to tasks in which a metacognitive judgment is
given either after a type 1 response (i.e., Pleskac and Busemeyer,
2010) or at the same time (i.e., “sure the word was presented
previously”; Ratcliff and Starns, 2009). However, the results of
neurophysiological and behavioral studies on perception and
memory suggest that some results of post-decisional processing
could be available to retrospective judgments but not to
prospective judgments and type 1 response. For example, it
has been shown that in speeded response tasks stimuli-related
information is still processed when a type 1 response is being
executed, even though the amount of evidence does not change
(Burk et al., 2014). Therefore participants can realize they are
committing errors and change their responses when allowed
(Van Zandt and Maldonado-Molina, 2004; Resulaj et al., 2009;
Burk et al., 2014). Making a mistake decreases participants’
confidence. The error-related electroencephalography activity,
present after an erroneous motor response has been launched,
is associated with lower confidence in the preceding perceptual
decision (Scheffers and Coles, 2000; Boldt and Yeung, 2015).
Moreover, a level of certainty is related to the amount of time
it takes to prepare and execute a type 1 response. Shorter
reaction time in a perceptual task is associated with increased
confidence (i.e., Petrusic and Baranski, 2003). Similarly, pre-
judgment retrieval fluency (that is, its latency and success)
correlates with metacognitive judgments about past and future
memory performance (Kelley and Lindsay, 1993; Matvey
et al., 2001; Dougherty et al., 2005; Koriat and Ma’ayan,
2005).
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Therefore, it seems that, contrary to the “trace-strength” and
“direct translation” hypotheses, the results of post-decisional and
post-response processing could be integrated into metacognitive
judgments. However, this additional information would be fed
only into retrospective reports, making them more accurate than
prospective ones. In order to test this hypothesis we designed a
task in which participants rated their decision certainty either
immediately before or immediately after a type 1 response.
The main task required participants to work on anagrams
for a short period of time, and then to decide whether a
presented target word was a solution. The target word was
either a solution or was matched to the solution in a way that
rejecting it as a potential solution was not easy. On the contrary,
targets were often misleading because they contained almost the
same letters as the anagrams. To minimize the possibility of
participants counting, remembering and comparing the letters
between anagrams and targets, at least seven letter anagrams
were used and the targets were presented briefly. There was
one condition with a retrospective confidence report (target-
decision-metacognition, tDM). In this condition participants
first saw a target, then responded regarding whether or not the
target was an anagram solution and then rated their confidence
in the preceding response. Two conditions were created for
prospective confidence reports in which participants were asked
to rate their certainty in the following response. Prospective
conditions differed from each other in respect to whether
confidence ratings were given after or before seeing a target
word. In the metacognition-target-decision condition (MtD)
participants first rated their confidence in a future response and
were then presented with a potential solution. In the target-
metacognition-decision condition (tMD) participants were first
presented with a potential solution and then rated confidence
in a future response. The two prospective conditions were
introduced in order to control possible problems caused by
targets being presented either before or after a metacognitive
judgment. In the tMD condition, when the target is presented
before confidence ratings one cannot exclude the possibility that
participants make their decisions covertly before reporting their
confidence. On the other hand, when participants are required
to rate their future decision certainty before seeing the target
(MtD), they are provided with less decision-related information.
We hypothesized that metacognitive accuracy would be lower in
both prospective conditions than in the retrospective condition.
This would support the idea that different internal cues are
integrated in each type of judgment and this difference is not
explained simply by the amount of information provided by the
task.
METHODS
Participants
Ninety-seven volunteers, 65 women, aged 18–30 (M = 21.73,
SD = 2.1) took part in the experiment in return for a small
payment. All participants had normal or corrected to normal
vision and gave written consent to participation in the study. The
ethical committee of the Institute of Psychology approved the
experimental protocol.
Materials
The experiment was run on PC computers using E-Prime. For the
purpose of the study, 60 three-syllable Polish nouns containing
7–10 letters were chosen from a frequency list (Mandera et al.,
2015). The words were paired so that 19 pairs of them differed
by just 1 letter (in English this could be: SENATOR-TOASTER)
and 11 pairs, which differed by 2 letters (e.g., RESTAURANT-
TRANSLATOR), which could be either exchanged or added.
The anagrams were made by randomly mixing the letters of
one word in a pair. Three judges chose one letter string for
each anagram that was least similar to any word and did not
contain any syllables included in the solution or target word.
The list of anagrams to solve was the same for all participants
but different solutions (i.e., correct or incorrect) were suggested.
Participants were asked to rate the confidence of their future
or past decision (“How confident are you that you will make
the right decision?” or “How confident are you that you made
the right decision?”). The options were: “I am guessing,” “I
am not confident,” “I am quite confident,” and “I am very
confident.”
Procedure
Participants were tested in small groups in a computer laboratory
and randomly assigned to one of three conditions: they firstly
decided if a target word presented on a screen was an anagram
solution and then judged their confidence (target-decision-
metacognitive judgment, tDM), they prospectively rated the
confidence of their decision after seeing a target (tMD), or they
prospectively rated the confidence of their decision before seeing
a target (MtD).
The outline of the procedure is presented in Figure 1. Each
trial started with a fixation-cross appearing for 1 s and followed
by an anagram written in capital letters. Participants had 20 s
to work on each anagram. Then it was masked by $$$$$$$$$$
symbol for 200ms. In the tDM condition, a 200ms blank screen
followed the mask and then a target word appeared for 350ms.
Then a word “solution?” was presented in the center with two
options “yes” and “no” on both sides. After making the decision
participants were asked to rate their certainty on the confidence
scale. In the MtD condition participants were first asked to rate
their confidence in correct decision about the solution, then they
were presented a target word (preceded by the mask and the
blank screen), with decision to be made at the end of a trial.
In the tMD condition a target word (preceded by the mask
and the blank screen) were presented first and then participants
were asked to rate the certainty of the solution decision and,
in the end, to make the actual decision. Participants had 3 s for
decision and metacognitive judgment. Decision about a target
word was expressed by pressing “1” or “2” key on a numerical
keyboard with the right hand, and the confidence level was
reported with keys “1,” “2,” “3,” and “4” using the left hand
(from “1” representing “I am guessing” to “4” representing “I am
very confident”). Half of the presented targets were the correct
solutions. There were two blocks of trials with 15 anagrams each.
At the beginning of experiment participants were shown two
examples of simple anagrams and had a chance to try to solve
them.
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FIGURE 1 | The three conditions of the anagram task. tDM, target-decision-metacognitive judgment; MtD, metacognitive judgment-target-decision; tMD,
target-metacognitive judgment-decision.
Data Analysis
Metacognitive accuracy was operationalized as the relationship
between the accuracy of identifying an anagram solution and
the reported confidence in this decision (Sandberg et al., 2010;
Norman et al., 2011). The relation between confidence and
accuracy was analyzed using logistic regression, which is the
correct model for predicting binary outcomes like accuracy
(Norman and Price, 2015). Logistic regression analysis is free
from theoretical assumptions about the source of confidence and
therefore is considered by us as a better method of analysing
metacognitive accuracy than the popular alternatives based on
signal detection theory (but see: Rausch et al., 2015). There are
few other important advantages of logistic regression that are
worth mentioning: (1) it does not require binary metacognitive
ratings, therefore it does not force us to simplify the model, (2)
themixedmodel framework allows us to answer several statistical
questions as well as to control for the random effect of subjects in
the context of a single comprehensive analysis, (3) mixed models
tolerate unbalanced designs.
The mixed logistic regression models were fitted using the
lme4 package in the R Statistical Environment (Bates et al., 2015;
R Core Team, 2015) using standard (0/1) contrast coding. In our
main model the fixed effects were Confidence ratings (4 levels),
Condition (3 levels) and their interaction, and the only random
effect included was the participant specific intercept. Confidence
ratings were centered on the lowest values (guessing) and the
basic condition was the retrospective judgment condition (tDM).
Therefore the regression slope reflects the relation between
metacognition and accuracy (metacognitive accuracy) while the
intercept informs about performance level when participants
report guessing. Statistical significance was assessed by means of
the Wald test.
It was important to test metacognitive accuracy of only those
participants who were actually working on solving anagrams and
did not simply guess whether a presented word was or was not
the solution. Since it is hard to keep performance in a problem-
solving task on a constant and higher than chance level, we
decided a priori to analyse the data of only those participants
whose performance in the anagram task would be equal or higher
than 60%. We also fitted the model to the data of all participants
with performance above 50% obtaining similar coefficients and
pattern of results but due to aforementioned reasons, with the
weaker effects.
RESULTS
Participants missed their responses in six per-cents of trials.
Accuracy level in the anagram task for each condition equalled:
tDM—70%, tMD—72%, MtD—66% and was significantly lower
in MtD than in other conditions (tDM-MtD: z = 2, p <
0.05; tMD-MtD: z = 2.9, p < 0.01). The data of 10
participants with accuracy level below 60% and 1 participant
with confidence rating variance equal to 0 were excluded from
the analysis. Among the remaining participants accuracy differed
only between tMD and MtD condition (z = 2.6, p < 0.01). We
did not find significant differences between conditions in terms of
decision bias, therefore the “yes” and “no” response were chosen
equally frequently (|z| ≤ 1, p > 0.3). The descriptive statistics
of task accuracy and confidence ratings are presented on Table 1
and Figure 2.
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TABLE 1 | The average accuracy and confidence in each condition.
n Accuracy (%) Confidence
M SD
tDM 30 73 2.83 0.95
MtD 28 74 2.20 1.09
tMD 28 71 2.93 0.92
FIGURE 2 | Average accuracy, scale response frequency and model fit
for the relationship between accuracy and confidence ratings in each
condition (tDM, target-decision-metacognition; MtD,
metacognition-target-decision; tMD, target-metacognition-decision).
The position of filled circles represents average accuracy for each scale point.
The frequency describes the proportion of each confidence rating response in
each condition. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
In order to analyse the effect of decision-metacognition order
on metacognitive accuracy we fitted a mixed logistic regression
model to Accuracy data with Condition (tDM, tMD, MtD),
Confidence and their interaction as fixed effects, and a random
participant specific intercept (Table 2 and Figure 2). The first row
in Table 2 (intercept) estimates the average accuracy (on the logit
scale) in the baseline condition (condition tDM, lowest rating
= guessing). When reporting guessing, participants’ accuracy in
tDM did not differ from chance level (z = 0.85, p = 0.4). The
second and the third row show that the decision accuracy for the
lowest scale rating was not significantly different in tMD than in
tDM (z = 1.78, p = 0.08) but was significantly better in MtD
than in tDM (z = 2.35, p = 0.02). The forth row estimates
the relationship between Accuracy and Confidence in the tDM
condition, and shows it is statistically significant (z = 6.73, p <
0.001). The fifth row indicates that relation between Accuracy
and Confidence was higher when the confidence was rated
retrospectively than when the confidence was rated prospectively
TABLE 2 | Regression coefficients for the logistic regression mixed model
for accuracy.
Number of participants: 86 Estimate SE Z p
Number of observations: 2368
Intercept 0.14 0.17 0.85 0.40
Condition tMD 0.46 0.26 1.78 0.08
Condition MtD 0.48 0.21 2.35 0.02*
Confidence 0.63 0.09 6.73 <0.001***
Confidence: Condition tMD −0.23 0.14 −1.68 0.046*
Confidence: Condition MtD −0.34 0.12 −2.78 0.003**
likelihood ratio χ2(5) = 89, p < 0.001.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
but after target word presentation (the difference between tDM
and tMD slopes: z = −1.68, p = 0.046, directional test).
Similarly, the last row shows that metacognitive accuracy was
stronger when confidence was rated retrospectively than when
the confidence was rated prospectively but before target word
presentation (the difference between tDM and MtD slopes:
z = −2.77, p = 0.003, directional test). Reparametrisation of
the model showed no difference in Accuracy-Confidence relation
between MtD and tMD conditions (z = −0.9, p = 0.4). We
also calculated the correlation between Confidence ratings and
Accuracy within each condition; it was statistically significant for
all of them (tDM: z = 6.73, p < 0.001; tMD: z = 4, p < 0.001;
and MtD: z = 3.7, p < 0.001).
In order to explore the possibility that the effect of condition
could have been caused merely by accumulation of semantic
activation of an anagram and target that was its actual solution,
we created a variable “Target is solution.” When targets were
anagrams’ solutions the average accuracy was 76% and the mean
level of confidence was 2.6 (SD = 1). When targets were not
solutions, the average accuracy equalled 75% and the confidence
level was 2.7 (SD = 1.08). After fitting a model that included this
variable (Condition×Confidence rating× Target is solution) we
did not observe any additional significant effects and the model
fit did not differ [model’s fit comparison: χ2(6) = 7, p = 0.3].
Additionally, we analyzed how the task condition influenced
metacognitive judgments themselves. Therefore we compared
the frequency of high and low confidence ratings between
conditions. All the ratings were encoded as binary outcomes,
either high (“I am quite confident,” “I am very confident”) or
low confidence (“I am guessing,” “I am not confident”). Mixed
logistic regression analysis revealed that high ratings were given
significantly more often when participants saw the target word
before the metacognitive judgment (the difference between MtD
and tDM: z = −4, 5, p < 0.001 and the difference between MtD
and tMD: z = 5, p < 0.001). We did not find any difference
between tMD and tDM (when the target was always shown first)
in the frequency of high confidence ratings (z = 0.6, p = 0.6).
DISCUSSION
The goal of the experiment was to find out whether prospective
and retrospective metacognitive judgments differ in their
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accuracy, and more specifically, whether confidence in response
is more accurate once the response has been given. On the
theoretical level our study aimed to differentiate between two
views on the source of metacognitive judgments, that is whether
they are based on the same or different information than type
1 responses. The results of the experiment showed that both
retrospective and prospective confidence judgments correlated
with performance level, but confidence ratings were less accurate
when given prospectively. Therefore although both types of
judgments seem to be partially based on the same information as
type 1 responses (in that they are both related to performance),
different factors influence their accuracy. One of the prospective
conditions (MtD) differed from the retrospective one also in
the level of the anagram task performance for the lowest scale
point. This means that participants in MtD condition performed
better that in tDM when reporting guessing. The results of the
experiment also showed the effect of tasks on confidence rating
strategy. Participants who were not shown the suggested solution
before metacognitive judgment was required were less confident
in their decisions.
The results supported our hypothesis that retrospective
confidence judgments would be more accurate than prospective
judgments and are in line with the view that metacognitive
reports are based on different information than the decisions
they relate to. One controversy between metacognitive theories
is whether confidence is built only on evidence available at
the moment of a type 1 decision (Vickers and Lee, 1998;
Higham et al., 2009) or whether it is the result of a separate
evidence accumulation stage that happens after the primary
decision has been made (Petrusic and Baranski, 2003; Pleskac
and Busemeyer, 2010). If type 1 response and metacognition
are based on the same information, it means that in case of
prospective judgment a decision or memory access attempt
has to be made at the time of the judgment. This could
result in lower performance level due to the smaller amount
of time available for processing decision-related evidence, but
without changing metacognitive accuracy. However, the stronger
relationship between retrospective reports and task accuracy
suggest that prospective judgments are deprived of additional
information that might increase the accuracy of retrospective
judgment.
In our opinion, the results add to the body of evidence
from neurophysiological and behavioral experiments, as well
as from modeling, suggesting that metacognitive judgments
could be based on evidence unavailable to a type 1 response
(Petrusic and Baranski, 2003; Ploran et al., 2007; Resulaj
et al., 2009; Hilgenstock et al., 2014; Graziano et al., 2015).
Moreover, the results suggest that response-related information
could be integrated into metacognitive judgment. A variety of
studies in different paradigms has shown a negative correlation
between reaction time and metacognitive rating (Kelley and
Lindsay, 1993; Matvey et al., 2001; Petrusic and Baranski, 2003;
Dougherty et al., 2005; Koriat and Ma’ayan, 2005; Mealor and
Dienes, 2013). Although it could be argued that reaction time
only reflects the quality of stimulus or memory trace, Kiani
et al. (2014) have recently shown the same relation for fixed
stimulus strength. One interesting direction of investigating
metacognition is the potential link to other monitoring functions
such as error detection (Scheffers and Coles, 2000; Steinhauser
and Yeung, 2012; Boldt and Yeung, 2015; Graziano et al.,
2015) or interoceptive feedback (Wessel et al., 2011). A recent
study has also shown that metacognitive judgment could be
influenced by motor-related neural activity. In the experiment
by Fleming et al. (2015) confidence was lowered by transcranial
magnetic stimulation of the premotor cortex area associated with
a response to an item that had not been chosen. Although most
of the aforementioned data come from studies on perception,
the process of building metacognitive judgment about memory-
based problem solving performance might be even more
complex.
Apart from the overall metacognitive accuracy, prospective
judgments also differed from retrospective ones in terms of
the average task performance for the lowest scale point that is
when participants reported guessing. Moreover, participants in
the MtD condition who were required to rate their decision
certainty before seeing a potential solution more often reported
low confidence. There are at least two possible interpretations
of those results. Firstly, it could indicate that participants used
a more cautious strategy when assessing their certainty before
responding to a type 1 task and were even more careful when
having to do so before even seeing a target. Therefore, both
above chance level accuracy for the lowest confidence rating and
high frequency of low ratings would indicate cautious strategy.
The other interpretation states that stimulus-related information
might not always be sufficient to reduce basic uncertainty, and
confidence arises when more internal and external cues are
available. This could especially be the case for the MtD condition,
for which not knowing the target before a metacognitive
judgment was required made participants uncertain about their
future response accuracy.
One potential problem with comparing metacognitive
accuracy between the three conditions is the difference in type 1
task performance level. Participants in the MtD condition who
were required to assess their confidence in a future decision
before seeing the target words performed the anagram task worse
than the other groups. Although task difficulty might affect
both the decision and metacognitive judgment (but see: Scott
et al., 2014 for “blind insight” effect), we found no differences in
metacognitive accuracy between the two prospective conditions
even though they differed in task 1 performance level. A probable
explanation of the lower performance in the MtD condition is
that the anagram-related information in memory was fading
because in this condition the time between solving the anagram
and seeing the target was longest. This indirectly supports our
prediction that in this task participants make decisions at the
moment of seeing the target and then just remember their “yes”
or “no” response until they express it. If this were true, it would
mean that not only decision but also motor response should
be considered as factors increasing metacognitive judgment
accuracy.
To sum up, the results of our experiment showed that
confidence judgments are more accurate when they refer
to the response already given than when they are about a
future response. Our results seem to be inconsistent with
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“direct translation” hypothesis and fit better within a dynamic,
two-stage evidence accumulation framework which takes into
consideration both time and post-decision processing (e.g.,
Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010). However, we think that there is
a need for an extended theory of confidence accommodating
data suggesting that confidence is a result of monitoring the
entire decision-making process (e.g., Graziano et al., 2015)
and could be informed by many sources of evidence. Also,
although studies on metamemory and confidence judgments
describe different time scales and different levels of processing,
we believe more work should be done to integrate the knowledge
from those fields. As confidence measured in both research
paradigms refers to the same judgment about one’s performance
this integration would be fruitful for better understanding the
mechanisms of human metacognition (Fleming and Dolan,
2012; Yeung and Summerfield, 2012). For example, an evidence
accumulation framework should attempt to explain all types
of judgments, including JOLs and FOKs, and to specify
what types of evidence could be accumulated to each of
them.
In the end we would like to point out that our results
might also have methodological and theoretical implications
for consciousness research. Confidence ratings and other
metacognitive scales (also called type 2 judgments) have been
widely used in this area (for a review see Timmermans and
Cleeremans, 2015) as tools for discriminating between conscious
and unconscious knowledge (Dienes et al., 1995) and for
assessing the level of stimuli awareness (Sandberg et al., 2010).
The results of our experiments are in line with data showing
that when using subjective scales (like confidence rating or
Perceptual Awareness Scale) one should take into account the
order of type 1 and type 2 responses (Wierzchon´ et al., 2014).
Although in implicit learning studies type 2 judgments are
usually given after the primary forced-choice response, this
is not always the case for perception studies (Del Cul et al.,
2007, 2009; Rounis et al., 2010; Wierzchon´ et al., 2014; Jachs
et al., 2015). From a theoretical point of view, it is worth
trying to reinterpret the discussion between the one-source
and the multi-source views on metacognition in the context
of consciousness theories. In consciousness research, if one
discusses the issue it is usually assumed that the awareness
judgment is based on the availability of a representation of
information that is becoming available (e.g., Del Cul et al.,
2009). This assumption seems to be consistent with one-source
view on metacognition. A similar assumption is made when
metacognitive awareness is assessed as the meta-d’ measure used
in context of those studies assumes that judgments refer to the
representation of the stimuli. Our data seem to suggest that
the accumulation models should be discussed in the context of
theories of consciousness. This seemsmost obvious in the context
of hierarchical models of consciousness (Lau and Rosenthal,
2011; Timmermans et al., 2012). These models claim that
conscious awareness of a given stimulus or memory content
requires the completion of processes leading to a type 1 decision
in order to re-represent their content. Our data suggests that this
re-presentation could take into the account not only the stimuli
representation but also that some other information contributing
to type 2 might be involved. Thus, we believe that establishing
a connection between hierarchical models of consciousness and
metacognition might be a fruitful way to research metacognitive
awareness.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
MS and MW proposed the concept of the study. MS collected
data, and BP made statistical analysis, with suggestions provided
by all co-authors. MS drafted the manuscript; MW and BP
provided critical revisions. All authors approved the final version
of the manuscript for submission.
FUNDING
This work was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland
HARMONIA grant given to MW (2014/14/M/HS6/00911).
REFERENCES
Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., and Walker, S. (2015). Fitting linear mixed-
effects models using lme4. J. Stat. Softw. 67, 1–48. doi: 10.18637/jss.v0
67.i01
Boldt, A., and Yeung, N. (2015). Shared neural markers of decision confidence and
error detection. J. Neurosci. 35, 3478–3484. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0797-
14.2015
Burk, D., Ingram, J. N., Franklin, D.W., Shadlen,M. N., andWolpert, D.M. (2014).
Motor effort alters changes of mind in sensorimotor decision making. PLoS
ONE 9:e92681. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0092681
Busey, T. A., Tunnicliff, J., Loftus, G. R., and Loftus, E. F. (2000). Accounts of
the confidence-accuracy relation in recognition memory. Psychon. Bull. Rev.
7, 26–48. doi: 10.3758/BF03210724
Chua, E. F., Schacter, D. L., and Sperling, R. A. (2009). Neural correlates
of metamemory: a comparison of feeling-of-knowing and retrospective
confidence judgments. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 21, 1751–1765. doi:
10.1162/jocn.2009.21123
Del Cul, A., Baillet, S., and Dehaene, S. (2007). Brain dynamics underlying
the nonlinear threshold for access to consciousness. PLoS Biol. 5:e260. doi:
10.1371/journal.pbio.0050260
Del Cul, A., Dehaene, S., Reyes, P., Bravo, E., and Slachevsky, A. (2009). Causal
role of prefrontal cortex in the threshold for access to consciousness. Brain 132,
2531–2540. doi: 10.1093/brain/awp111
Dienes, Z., Altmann, G. T. M., Kwan, L., and Goode, A. (1995). Unconscious
knowledge of artificial grammars is applied strategically. J. Exp. Psychol. 21,
1322–1338. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.21.5.1322
Dougherty, M. R., Scheck, P., Nelson, T. O., and Narens, L. (2005). Using the past
to predict the future.Mem. Cogn. 33, 1096–1115. doi: 10.3758/BF03193216
Dunlosky, J., Serra, M. J., Matvey, G., and Rawson, K. A. (2005). Second-order
judgments about judgments of learning. J. Gen. Psychol. 132, 335–346. doi:
10.3200/GENP.132.4.335-346
Fleming, S. M., and Dolan, R. J. (2012). The neural basis of metacognitive ability.
Philos. Trans. R. Soc. 367, 1338–1349. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2011.0417
Fleming, S. M., Maniscalco, B., Ko, Y., Amendi, N., Ro, T., and Lau, H. (2015).
Action-specific disruption of perceptual confidence. Psychol. Sci. 26, 89–98. doi:
10.1177/0956797614557697
Graziano, M., Parra, L. C., and Sigman, M. (2015). Neural correlates of perceived
confidence in a partial report paradigm. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 27, 1090–1103. doi:
10.1162/jocn_a_00759
Hart, J. (1965). Memory and the feeling-of-knowing experience. J. Educ. Psychol.
56, 208–216. doi: 10.1037/h0022263
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 218
Siedlecka et al. But I Was So Sure!
Higham, P. A., Perfect, T. J., and Bruno, D. (2009). Investigating strength and
frequency effects in recognition memory using type-2 signal detection theory.
J. Exp. Psychol. 35, 57–80. doi: 10.1037/a0013865
Hilgenstock, R., Weiss, T., and Witte, O. W. (2014). You’d better think
twice: post-decision perceptual confidence. Neuroimage 99, 323–331. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.05.049
Jachs, B., Blanco, M. J., Grantham-Hill, S., and Soto, D. (2015). On the
independence of visual awareness and metacognition: a signal detection
theoretic analysis. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 41, 269–276. doi:
10.1037/xhp0000026
Kelley, C. M., and Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Remembering mistaken for knowing: ease
of retrieval as a basis for confidence in answers to general knowledge questions.
J. Mem. Lang. 32, 1–24. doi: 10.1006/jmla.1993.1001
Kiani, R., Corthell, L., and Shadlen, M. N. (2014). Choice certainty is
informed by both evidence and decision time. Neuron 84, 1329–1342. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2014.12.015
Koriat, A., and Levy-Sadot, R. (2000). Conscious and unconscious metacognition:
a rejoinder. Conscious. Cogn. 9, 193–202. doi: 10.1006/ccog.2000.0436
Koriat, A., and Ma’ayan, H. (2005). The effects of encoding fluency and
retrieval fluency on judgments of learning. J. Mem. Lang. 52, 478–492. doi:
10.1016/j.jml.2005.01.001
Lau, H., and Rosenthal, D. (2011). Empirical support for higher-order
theories of conscious awareness. Trends Cogn. Sci. 15, 365–373. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009
Mandera, P., Keuleers, E., Wodniecka, Z., and Brysbaert, M. (2015). Subtlex-pl:
subtitle-based word frequency estimates for Polish. Behav. Res. Methods 47,
471–483. doi: 10.3758/s13428-014-0489-4
Matvey, G., Dunlosky, J., and Guttentag, R. (2001). Fluency of re- trieval at study
affects judgments of learning (JOLs): an analytic or nonanalytical basis for JOLs:
Mem. Cogn. 29, 222–233. doi: 10.3758/BF03194916
Mealor, A. D., and Dienes, Z. (2013). The speed of metacognition: taking time
to get to know one’s structural knowledge. Conscious. Cogn. 22, 123–136. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.009
Metcalfe, J. (2000). Feelings and judgments of knowing: is there a special noetic
state? Conscious. Cogn. 9, 178–186. doi: 10.1006/ccog.2000.0451
Metcalfe, J., Schwartz, B. L., and Joaquim, S. G. (1993). The cue-familiarity
heuristic in metacognition. J. Exp. Psychol. 19, 851–561. doi: 10.1037/0278-
7393.19.4.851
Metcalfe, J., and Son, L. K. (2012). “Anoetic, noetic, and autonoetic metacognition,”
in The Foundations of Metacognition, eds M. Beran, J. R. Brandl, J.
Perner, and J. Proust (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 289–301. doi:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646739.003.0019
Norman, E., and Price, M. C. (2015). “Measuring consciousness with
confidence ratings,” in Behavioural Methods in Consciousness Research,
ed M. Overgaard (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 159–180. doi:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688890.003.0010
Norman, E., Price, M. C., and Jones, E. (2011). Measuring strategic control
in artificial grammar learning. Conscious. Cogn. 20, 1920–1929. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2011.07.008
Pannu, J., Kaszniak, A., and Rapcsak, S. (2005). Metamemory for faces
following frontal lobe damage. J. Inter. Neuropsychol.l Soc. 11, 668–676. doi:
10.1017/s1355617705050873
Petrusic, W. M., and Baranski, J. V. (2003). Judging confidence influences decision
processing in comparative judgments. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 10, 177–183. doi:
10.3758/BF03196482
Pleskac, T. J., and Busemeyer, J. R. (2010). Two-stage dynamic signal detection: a
theory of choice, decision time, and confidence. Psychol. Rev. 117, 864–901. doi:
10.1037/a0019737
Ploran, E. J., Nelson, S. M., Velanova, K., Donaldson, D. I., Petersen, S. E., and
Wheeler, M. E. (2007). Evidence accumulation and the moment of recognition:
dissociating perceptual recognition processes using fMRI. J. Neurosci. 27,
11912–11924. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3522-07.2007
R Core Team (2015). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing.
Vienna: R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
Ratcliff, R., and Starns, J. J. (2009). Modeling confidence and response time in
recognition memory. Psychol. Rev. 116, 59–83. doi: 10.1037/a0014086
Rausch, M., Müller, H. J., and Zehetleitner, M. (2015). Metacognitive sensitivity
of subjective reports of decisional confidence and visual experience. Conscious.
Cogn. 35, 192–205. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2015.02.011
Resulaj, A., Kiani, R., Wolpert, D. M., and Shadlen, M. N. (2009). Changes of mind
in decision-making. Nature 461, 263–266. doi: 10.1038/nature08275
Rounis, E., Maniscalco, B., Rothwell, J. C., Passingham, R. E., and Lau, H.
(2010). Theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation to the prefrontal cortex
impairs metacognitive visual awareness. Cogn. Neurosci. 1, 165–175. doi:
10.1080/17588921003632529
Sandberg, K., Timmermans, B., Overgaard, M., and Cleeremans, A. (2010).
Measuring consciousness: is one measure better than the other? Conscious.
Cogn. 19, 1069–1078. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2009.12.013
Scheffers, M. K., and Coles, M. G. (2000). Performance monitoring in a confusing
world: error-related brain activity, judgments of response accuracy, and types of
errors. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 26, 141–151. doi: 10.1037/0096-
1523.26.1.141
Schnyer, D. M., Verfaellie, M., Alexander, M. P., LaFleche, G., Nicholls, L.,
and Kaszniak, A. W. (2004). A role for right medial prefontal cortex
in accurate feeling-of-knowing judgements: evidence from patients
with lesions to frontal cortex. Neuropsychologia 42, 957–966. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2003.11.020
Scott, R. B., and Dienes, Z. (2008). The conscious, the unconscious, and familiarity.
J. Exp. Psychol. 34, 1264–1288. doi: 10.1037/a0012943
Scott, R. B., Dienes, Z., Barrett, A. B., Bor, D., and Seth, A. K. (2014). Blind insight
metacognitive discrimination despite chance task performance. Psychol. Sci. 25,
2199–2208. doi: 10.1177/0956797614553944
Serra, M. J., and Metcalfe, J. (2009). “Effective implementation of metacognition,”
in Handbook of Metacognition in Education, eds D. J Hacker, J. Dunlosky, and
A. C. Graesser (New York, NY: Routlege), 278–298.
Steinhauser, M., and Yeung, N. (2012). Error awareness as evidence accumulation:
effects of speed-accuracy trade-off on error signalling. Front. Hum. Neurosci.
6:240. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00240
Timmermans, B., and Cleeremans, A. (2015). “How can we measure awareness?
An overview of current methods,” in Behavioural Methods in Consciousness
Research, ed M. Overgaard (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 21–46.
Timmermans, B., Schilbach, L., Pasquali, A., and Cleeremans, A. (2012). Higher
order thoughts in action: consciousness as an unconscious re-description
process. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B 367, 1412–1423. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2011.0421
Vickers, D., and Lee, M. D. (1998). Dynamic models of simple judgments:
I. Properties of a self-regulating accumulator module. Nonlinear Dynamics
Psychol. Life Sci. 2, 169–194. doi: 10.1023/A:1022371901259
Wessel, J. R., Danielmeier, C., and Ullsperger, M. (2011). Error awareness
revisited: accumulation of multimodal evidence from central and autonomic
nervous systems. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 3021–3036. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2011.
21635
Wierzchon´, M., Asanowicz, D., Paulewicz, B., and Cleeremans, A. (2012).
Subjective measures of consciousness in artificial grammar learning task.
Conscious. Cogn. 21, 1141–1153. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2012.05.012
Wierzchon´, M., Paulewicz, B., Asanowicz, D., Timmermans, B., and Cleeremans,
A. (2014). Different subjective awareness measures demonstrate the influence
of visual identification on perceptual awareness ratings. Conscious. Cogn. 27,
109–120. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2014.04.009
Van Zandt, T., and Maldonado-Molina, M. M. (2004). Response reversals in
recognition memory. J. Exp. Psychol. 30, 1147–1166. doi: 10.1037/0278-
7393.30.6.1147
Yeung, N., and Summerfield, C. (2012).Metacognition in human decision-making:
confidence and error monitoring. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 367,
1310–1321. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2011.0416
Zehetleitner, M., and Rausch, M. (2013). Being confident without seeing: what
subjective measures of visual consciousness are about. Attention Perception
Psychophys. 75, 1406–1426. doi: 10.3758/s13414-013-0505-2
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2016 Siedlecka, Paulewicz andWierzchon´. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 218
